Philosophical theology, at its most rigorous, is a discipline advanced through sustained dialectical engagement. Its history is not one of static pronouncements but of dynamic argumentation, where theses are met with powerful antitheses, which in turn are subjected to critical scrutiny, leading to synthesis or refined defense. This report enters into that venerable tradition. It takes as its subject fifteen potent objections—antitheses—that have been leveled against core tenets of classical theism. These objections, often originating from fields as diverse as quantum physics, moral philosophy, and biblical criticism, are formidable and represent some of the most serious intellectual challenges to theistic belief. This analysis, however, treats these established objections not as conclusions but as starting points. Each antithesis is taken as a new thesis, which is then subjected to a rigorous and powerfully argued refutation—a new antithesis. The purpose is not to offer a final, unassailable word, but to contribute to the ongoing philosophical conversation by demonstrating that these common defeaters are themselves vulnerable to significant, and often decisive, logical and metaphysical critique.

#The Role of Defeaters

The methodology employed throughout this report is grounded in the philosophical analysis of rational belief and the nature of “defeaters.” As articulated in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of religion, a defeater is an argument or piece of evidence that challenges the warrant for a particular belief.1 These can be broadly categorized into two types. A
rebutting defeater aims to show that a given proposition is false. An undercutting defeater is more modest, aiming only to show that one lacks sufficient justification for believing the proposition is true.1
The “new theses” presented in this report are, in essence, prominent defeaters raised against classical theism. The “new antitheses” constructed herein function as defeaters of the defeaters. They seek to rebut the objector’s claims by showing them to be false, or to undercut them by exposing fallacious reasoning, category errors, or a lack of justificatory support. The success of an argument, therefore, depends on the comparative warrant of a premise versus its defeater.1 This report aims to demonstrate that for each of the fifteen cases examined, the defeater offered against theism is weaker than the arguments that can be marshaled in its defense. Dialectical success is not measured by the persuasion of an opponent, which can be influenced by myriad psychological factors, but by the logical and evidentiary strength of the arguments presented.1

#Structure and Aims

This report is structured in five parts. Part I addresses arguments concerning the metaphysical foundations of existence, such as causality, infinity, and the principle of sufficient reason. Part II analyzes arguments surrounding the nature of the First Cause, including the deduction of its attributes and the coherence of doctrines like divine simplicity. Part III engages with the profound challenges of God’s relationship to morality and the problem of evil in its various forms. Part IV investigates complex issues of divine knowledge, divine action, and the interpretation of scriptural narratives like the Genesis flood. Finally, Part V explores arguments about the nature of reality, including the existence of non-physical beings and the ultimate fate of humanity.
The overarching aim is to provide a comprehensive and analytically precise resource that demonstrates how fifteen of the most significant objections to classical theism are themselves subject to powerful and logically sound refutation. By doing so, this report seeks to show that the intellectual resources of classical theism are far more robust and coherent than its critics often assume.

#Part I: Arguments Concerning Metaphysical Foundations

#Section 1. On the Principle of Causality: A Refutation of the Claim that Quantum Mechanics Falsifies Ex Nihilo Nihilo Fit

#New Thesis: The Scientific Refutation of Causality

The first premise of the Kalam Cosmological Argument—Whatever begins to exist has a cause—is often supported by the metaphysical principle ex nihilo nihil fit (out of nothing, nothing comes).2 A prominent modern objection contends that this principle, once considered an intuitive axiom, has been falsified by the discoveries of 20th-century physics. Specifically, phenomena observed in quantum mechanics, such as the spontaneous emergence of virtual particle pairs from the quantum vacuum, are presented as empirical evidence of events that occur without a cause.2 If particles can spring into being uncaused from the vacuum, then the universe itself could have sprung into being uncaused from a similar pre-cosmic state. This scientific claim is thus positioned as a direct rebutting defeater to the foundational premise of a major cosmological argument.

#New Antithesis: The Metaphysical Resilience of the Causal Principle

This scientific objection, while appearing formidable, rests on a fundamental category error: the conflation of the physicist’s “nothing” with the philosopher’s “nothing.” The causal principle, properly understood as a metaphysical axiom concerning being and non-being, is not and cannot be falsified by quantum mechanics. The objection fails because it misinterprets the nature of the quantum vacuum, misunderstands the scope of causality, and relies on a non-compulsory interpretation of quantum physics.

#1.1 The Category Error: Conflating Physical and Metaphysical Nothingness

The assertion that quantum mechanics shows something can come from “nothing” is predicated on an equivocation of the word “nothing.” The quantum vacuum, from which virtual particles are said to emerge, is not metaphysical nothingness. Metaphysical nothingness is the absolute absence of any reality whatsoever—no being, no properties, no potentials, no structures, and no laws. It is non-being in its strictest sense.
The quantum vacuum, by stark contrast, is a highly structured and complex physical reality. It is a quantum field, or a collection of quantum fields, which possesses energy, is governed by the determinate laws of quantum field theory, and has a rich physical structure.3 It is, unequivocally, a
something. Therefore, the emergence of virtual particles is not a case of something coming from nothing (ex nihilo), but a case of something coming from something else—namely, a fluctuation in the energy of a pre-existing physical field. The event is a state transition within an already existing physical system. The principle of ex nihilo nihil fit remains untouched by this phenomenon, as it is a principle about what can emerge from absolute non-being, a state to which physics, by its very nature, cannot speak.2 To use the scientific description of the quantum vacuum to refute a metaphysical principle about non-being is a straightforward category error.
The power of this refutation can be seen in a dialectical maneuver. For the scientific objection to succeed, the quantum vacuum must be equivalent to metaphysical nothingness. However, if it were truly nothing, it would have no properties, no structure, and obey no laws. It could not, therefore, be the subject of a scientific theory like quantum mechanics. The very fact that physicists can describe the vacuum with mathematical equations proves that it is a complex something. The objection is thus self-defeating: the evidence it marshals (the physics of the vacuum) only works if it contradicts the objection’s own premise (that the vacuum is nothing).

#1.2 The Misinterpretation of Causality at the Origin of Time

A related objection posits that causality is intrinsically temporal, requiring a cause to precede its effect in time. Since the Big Bang represents the beginning of time itself, there could be no prior moment for a cause to exist, rendering the concept of a cause for the universe incoherent.1 This objection, however, relies on an unnecessarily restrictive definition of causality.
The defenders of the Kalam argument do not posit a temporally prior cause. Rather, they argue that the cause of the universe can be, and in this unique case must be, simultaneously causal with its effect.3 The first cause’s act of bringing the universe into existence
is the first moment of time.2 To insist that a cause must exist “before” time began is to pose an incoherent demand, as it presupposes a temporal location (a moment before time) that, by definition, cannot exist.2 The relationship is one of causal priority, not necessarily temporal priority. Therefore, the objection that the universe cannot have a cause because nothing preceded it fails, as it attacks a straw man version of the causal relationship at the absolute beginning.

#1.3 The Unsettled State of Quantum Interpretation

The claim that quantum events are definitively “uncaused” is not a settled fact of science but a feature of one particular, and highly contested, interpretation of quantum mechanics—the Copenhagen interpretation. This view is far from universally accepted within the physics community. Alternative interpretations exist that are fully deterministic, meaning every event has a cause, even at the quantum level.
For instance, the pilot-wave theory, also known as Bohmian mechanics, posits hidden variables that deterministically guide the behavior of particles. The Everettian, or “Many-Worlds,” interpretation is also fully deterministic, with the wave function evolving in a perfectly predictable way.3 Given that these deterministic interpretations remain live options among physicists, it is a significant overstatement to claim that science has proven the existence of uncaused events. At best, one can say that
some interpretations of quantum mechanics are consistent with indeterminacy. This lack of consensus means that science cannot be invoked as a definitive defeater of the causal principle.

#1.4 The Primacy of the Metaphysical Principle

Ultimately, the first premise of the Kalam argument is defended not as a mere inductive generalization from experience (which could be overturned by new science) but as a fundamental metaphysical principle.2 The principle that being cannot arise from non-being is grounded in the intuition that non-being has no properties, no potential, and no power to produce anything.3 To deny this is to affirm that something can create itself, which is a logical absurdity.
Science, as an empirical enterprise, investigates the behavior of existing things; it is not equipped to adjudicate on the ultimate metaphysical question of why there is something rather than nothing.2 The causal principle is a prerequisite for the rational intelligibility of the world. The entire scientific enterprise is a search for causal explanations. To abandon the principle at the most fundamental level—the existence of the universe itself—is to declare that the cosmos is ultimately a brute, unintelligible fact. While one is free to adopt such a position, it represents a departure from the foundational assumption of rational inquiry, and the burden of proof lies with the one who wishes to make an exception for the universe as a whole.

#Section 2. On the Nature of Infinity: A Refutation of the Coherence of an Actually Infinite Past

#New Thesis: The Mathematical Vindication of the Actual Infinite

Medieval arguments against an infinitely old universe, such as those championed by al-Ghazali and later by William Lane Craig, often rest on the purported logical impossibility of an “actual infinite”.4 The new thesis holds that these arguments are obsolete, having been rendered invalid by the mathematical work of Georg Cantor in the 19th century. Cantor’s set theory provides a rigorous, logically coherent framework for understanding the actual infinite, including the existence of different “sizes” of infinity (different cardinalities). Since the actual infinite is mathematically coherent, any philosophical or theological argument that denies the possibility of an infinitely old universe on the grounds that it would instantiate an actual infinite is based on a mathematical misunderstanding and is therefore unsound.4

#New Antithesis: The Metaphysical Absurdity of a Realized Infinite Past

While the mathematical concept of the actual infinite is a consistent and powerful tool within the abstract realm of formal systems, its application to the concrete, spatio-temporal world results in irreconcilable metaphysical absurdities. The coherence of a mathematical model does not entail the metaphysical possibility of its concrete realization. The medieval arguments against an infinite past are not dissolved by set theory; they are merely ignored by it, as they address problems of concrete reality that abstract mathematics is not designed to solve.

#2.1 The Distinction Between Abstract and Concrete Reality

The fundamental error in the new thesis is a failure to distinguish between the potential, abstract realm of mathematics and the actual, concrete realm of physical reality. Cantorian set theory deals with abstract collections, or sets, whose members are defined into existence by the mathematician. The past, in contrast, is not an abstract set but a concrete series of events that have been causally generated and have actually transpired in sequence.4 One cannot simply assume that the properties of abstract sets can be mapped onto the series of past events without committing what Alfred North Whitehead termed the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” The logic of abstract collections does not automatically translate to the logic of concrete temporal succession.

#2.2 The Enduring Absurdity of an Instantiated Actual Infinite

The paradoxes that arise from positing an actually infinite number of things in the real world are not mathematical paradoxes but metaphysical ones. They demonstrate that the instantiation of an actual infinite in reality would violate fundamental principles of being.
A classic illustration is Hilbert’s Hotel, a hypothetical hotel with an actually infinite number of rooms, all of which are occupied. Despite being full, the hotel can still accommodate new guests by having the guest in room 1 move to room 2, the guest in room 2 to room 3, and so on, freeing up room 1. This scenario, while logically possible for an abstract set, is metaphysically absurd when applied to a real, concrete hotel. It describes a state of affairs where the hotel is simultaneously completely full and not completely full, a contradiction in the real world of space and objects.
A more direct critique of an infinite past is al-Ghazali’s paradox of the rotating planets, cited by Craig.4 Imagine two planets that have been orbiting a star from eternity past, but one orbits at twice the speed of the other. If the past is actually infinite, then both planets must have completed an actually infinite number of rotations. Yet, one planet has clearly completed twice as many rotations as the other. This leads to the absurd conclusion that one infinite is twice as large as another (
∞=2×∞), which is impossible. The Cantorian response—that both sets of rotations have the same cardinality (ℵ0)—misses the point entirely. The issue is not the abstract size of the sets of completed orbits, but the concrete, traversed distance. One planet has traveled twice as far as the other. The mathematical tool of cardinality simply ignores the relevant metaphysical property of “distance traversed” and thus fails to resolve the physical and metaphysical absurdity.

#2.3 The Impossibility of Forming an Actual Infinite by Successive Addition

A temporal series of events, such as the history of the universe, is formed by successive addition: one event occurs, then another, then another. An actual infinite, by definition, is a completed, determinate, and bounded whole.4 It is metaphysically impossible to form such a completed whole by adding one member at a time, because for any number of events one adds, one can always add one more. The process of arriving at infinity through sequential addition could never be completed.
Since the past is a series of events formed by successive addition, it cannot be an actual infinite. At any given point in time, the past consists of a finite number of events. It is a potentially infinite series, meaning it can always be increased, but it is never an actually infinite, completed whole.4 Therefore, the series of past events must have had a beginning.

#2.4 The Corroboration from the A-Theory of Time

This conclusion is strongly supported by our common-sense experience of time, which is formalized in philosophy as the A-theory of time. According to the A-theory, the future does not yet exist and the past no longer exists; only the present is real.4 Time involves a genuine, objective flow or “becoming.” On this view, the past is a collection of events that is literally growing as the present moment moves forward. A collection that is formed by adding new members one at a time cannot, as argued above, ever become actually infinite. At any given moment, the past is necessarily finite. Thus, if the A-theory of time is correct, an infinite past is impossible. While the Kalam argument does not strictly depend on the A-theory—the argument from successive addition is potent even on a static B-theory—the A-theory provides powerful intuitive and philosophical support for its conclusion.

#Part II: Arguments Concerning the Nature of the First Cause

#Section 3. On the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): A Refutation of the Claim that the PSR is an Unjustified Axiom

#New Thesis: The PSR as an Unwarranted Assumption

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), which in its strong form states that for every fact or true proposition, there must be a sufficient reason or explanation for why it is the case, is a central pillar of rationalist cosmological arguments, particularly those of the Leibnizian variety.5 The new thesis objects that the PSR is nothing more than an unprovable and unjustified axiom. There is no non-circular way to prove that everything must have an explanation. Furthermore, to apply this principle to the universe as a whole—to what some philosophers call the Big Contingent Conjunctive Fact (BCCF), the conjunction of all contingent facts 7—is to commit a fallacy of composition. Just because events
within the universe have explanations, it does not follow that the universe as a whole must have one.3 Therefore, arguments that rely on the PSR to conclude a necessary being exists are unsound.

#New Antithesis: The PSR as a Prerequisite for Rationality

This objection fundamentally misunderstands the status of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The PSR is not an ordinary empirical premise in an argument but a foundational precondition for rationality itself, the denial of which is performatively self-contradictory and intellectually untenable. Its application to the universe is not a fallacy but a necessary extension of rational inquiry, the alternative to which is the acceptance of the cosmos as an ultimate, inexplicable brute fact—a position that undermines the very enterprise of science and philosophy.

#3.1 The PSR as a Precondition for Rationality and Its Self-Vindication

The PSR, in the words of Leibniz, is one of the “two great principles” of reasoning, alongside the principle of non-contradiction.6 It undergirds all attempts to make the world intelligible. To ask for a “proof” or a “sufficient reason” to believe in the PSR is already to presuppose its validity, for the questioner is demanding an explanation for the principle itself. The very act of engaging in rational debate or scientific inquiry is an implicit affirmation that there are reasons for things and that these reasons can be discovered.
To deny the PSR is to assert that some facts, events, or propositions may exist for no reason at all. If this were the case, then no argument could ever be conclusive. An opponent could always dismiss a conclusion by suggesting it is simply a brute fact that the conclusion is false, with no further explanation needed. The denial of the PSR thus erodes the foundation of reasoned discourse. It is, in this sense, performatively self-defeating. One cannot rationally argue against the foundation of rational argument.

#3.2 Defeating the Fallacy of Composition Charge

The charge that applying the PSR to the universe as a whole commits a fallacy of composition is a mischaracterization of the Leibnizian argument.3 The argument is not an inductive generalization from parts to a whole (e.g., “every brick in the wall is small, so the wall is small”). Rather, it applies the principle directly to a unique and specific entity: the totality of all contingent things, or the BCCF.7
The question is not, “Since all the parts have a reason, does the whole have a reason?” The question is, “Why does this specific collection of contingent facts obtain, rather than some other possible collection, or no collection at all?” The existence of the entire contingent cosmos is itself a fact that calls for an explanation. To claim that this specific fact alone requires no explanation, while all facts within it do, is not to avoid a fallacy but to engage in an act of special pleading. The principle applies to any contingent fact, and the BCCF is the largest contingent fact there is.

#3.3 The Intolerability of Ultimate Brute Factuality

The only alternative to accepting the PSR’s application to the cosmos is to embrace the view that the existence of the universe is an ultimate, inexplicable “brute fact.” It just is, and that is all there is to say. This position is profoundly anti-philosophical and anti-scientific. The entire history of science is a testament to the fruitfulness of assuming that phenomena have explanations and then searching for them. To halt this explanatory quest at the level of the universe itself is an arbitrary and intellectually unsatisfying move. It posits the entire cosmos as the one and only exception to the principle of rational intelligibility that governs every other domain of inquiry.

#3.4 Leibniz’s Argument from Contingency and the Need for a Necessary Being

The classic Leibnizian argument demonstrates why the explanation for the contingent cosmos must lie outside of it. The argument proceeds as follows 5:

Everything that exists has a sufficient reason for its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause.
The universe, as a collection of contingent things, is itself contingent—it could have been otherwise or not at all.
Therefore, the universe must have a sufficient reason for its existence that is external to it.
This external reason cannot be another contingent thing or an infinite series of contingent things, because that would not provide an ultimate or sufficient explanation; it would simply push the question back without end.5
Therefore, the ultimate and sufficient reason for the existence of the contingent universe must be found in a being whose existence is not contingent but necessary—a being that contains the reason for its own existence within its own nature.9 This necessary being is what is meant by God.

This line of reasoning reveals that the PSR, when applied to the fact of a contingent universe, logically leads to the conclusion of a necessary being as its ultimate explanation. It is not an unjustified leap but a rigorous deduction from the demand for rational intelligibility. Moreover, as the “New Cosmological Argument” demonstrates, one need not even defend the strongest version of the PSR. A weaker modal version, which posits only that an explanation for any contingent fact is possible, is sufficient to ground the argument for a necessary being, making the conclusion highly resilient to critique.8

#Section 4. On the Divine Attributes: A Refutation of the “Gap Problem” Objection

#New Thesis: The Unbridgeable Gap Between First Cause and God

A persistent and powerful objection against cosmological arguments is known as the “Gap Problem.” This objection concedes, for the sake of argument, that a cosmological proof might successfully establish the existence of a necessary, uncaused, and eternal First Cause. However, it maintains that there remains a vast, unbridgeable logical chasm between this abstract metaphysical entity and the traditional God of theism—a being who is personal, intelligent, powerful, and good.7 The First Cause, the objection suggests, could just as plausibly be an impersonal force, a set of physical laws, or a causally inert abstract object like the number set. The move from “First Cause” to “God” is therefore an unwarranted leap of faith, not a logical deduction.

#New Antithesis: Bridging the Gap Through Logical Deduction and Inference to the Best Explanation

The “Gap Problem” is not an unbridgeable chasm but a philosophical puzzle that, when analyzed correctly, reveals the very attributes it claims are missing. The transition from a timeless, changeless First Cause to a temporal, changing universe can only be coherently explained by invoking free, agent causation, which logically entails a personal being with a mind and will. Further attributes of intelligence and power can then be deduced via a cumulative case that employs inference to the best explanation, demonstrating that the gap is closed not by a single leap but by a series of rigorous logical steps.

#4.1 The Dilemma of the First Event

The central argument that bridges the gap from a necessary cause to a personal agent is the “argument from determination,” which addresses a critical dilemma.7 If the First Cause is, as the argument concludes, timeless, changeless, and eternal, and if the conditions for the existence of the universe (the effect) were eternally present and sufficient in the cause, then why is the effect not also eternal and changeless? Why did the universe
begin to exist a finite time ago rather than existing co-eternally with its cause? This question—how a temporal effect arises from a timeless cause—is the key that unlocks the personal nature of the cause.

#4.2 Eliminating Impersonal Causation

To solve this dilemma, one must consider the possible modes of causation for the first event.7

State-State or Event-Event Causation: If the cause is an impersonal set of deterministic conditions (a timeless “state”), and this state is eternally sufficient to produce the effect, then the effect must be co-eternal with the cause. There is no mechanism or “trigger” within a static, deterministic system to explain the initiation of the first event at a specific moment (t=0). Such impersonal, mechanical causation fails to explain a temporal beginning from an eternal cause.
Abstract Object Causation: The suggestion that the First Cause could be an abstract object, such as a mathematical platonic form, also fails. Abstract objects are, by their nature, causally inert and powerless. The number 7 cannot cause a rock to fall, and the set of all contingent facts cannot cause itself to become actual.10 An abstract cause cannot produce a concrete, physical effect.

#4.3 The Logical Necessity of Agent Causation

With impersonal and abstract causation eliminated, the only remaining coherent explanation is agent causation.7 A free agent, possessing a mind and will, can exist timelessly in a changeless state, possessing the
power to create but not exercising it. The agent can then freely and spontaneously choose to actualize that power, thus bringing a new, temporal causal chain (the universe) into being. This act of free will provides the “trigger” that explains the transition from a timeless cause to a temporal effect. It is analogous to a man who has been sitting from eternity with the power to stand, and who then freely decides to stand up. His free choice is what initiates the action. Therefore, to explain the beginning of the universe from a timeless First Cause, that cause must be a personal agent endowed with freedom of the will.

#4.4 Deducing Intelligence and Power via Cumulative Case

Once the personhood of the First Cause is established, the “Gap Problem” begins to close rapidly. Further attributes can be inferred through a cumulative case that builds upon this conclusion, often using inference to the best explanation.7

Intelligence: The universe is characterized by profound complexity, law-like regularity, and the fine-tuning of its physical constants and initial conditions to an incomprehensible degree of precision, making it hospitable for life.7 The inference to the best explanation for such specified complexity and apparent design is a cause that possesses immense intelligence. As the “New Cosmological Argument” explicitly argues, the “wondrous complexity” of the cosmos points to a “very powerful and intelligent” designer-creator.8
Power: The ability to bring the entire space-time universe into being from nothing is the definition of maximal, if not infinite, power.
Unity: While not strictly proven by the argument from determination, the principle of parsimony, or Occam’s Razor, suggests that we should not postulate more causes than are necessary. A single, necessary, personal, intelligent, and powerful being is the most economical explanation for the universe’s existence and features.7

This cumulative methodology shows that the “Gap Problem” is an illusion created by viewing cosmological arguments in isolation. When the argument from contingency is combined with the argument from determination and the teleological argument from fine-tuning, the gap between a “First Cause” and a “personal Creator” is systematically and logically bridged.

The classical doctrine of Divine Simplicity (DDS) holds that God is absolutely simple, without any composition of parts, whether physical or metaphysical. This entails that God’s essence is identical to His existence, and all of His attributes (e.g., knowledge, will, power) are identical to His essence and to each other.11 A powerful modern objection, the “modal collapse” argument, contends that this doctrine leads to a logical catastrophe. The argument proceeds as follows: If God is simple, then His act of creating the universe is identical to His divine essence. But God’s essence is necessary—He exists in all possible worlds. Therefore, His act of creation must also be necessary. If God’s creative act is necessary, then the universe (its effect) must also exist necessarily. This “collapses” all modal distinctions, eliminating contingency and leading to the fatalistic conclusion that everything that exists is necessary and could not have been otherwise.11

The modal collapse argument, despite its technical appearance, is logically invalid. It commits a well-known fallacy of illicit substitution into a modal context, first clearly identified by W.V.O. Quine. The argument’s failure stems from a misunderstanding of how identity statements function within the scope of modal operators like “necessarily,” specifically concerning the distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators. The defender of DDS can demonstrate the argument’s invalidity through rigorous logical analysis and by clarifying the distinction between God’s necessary intrinsic act and its contingent extrinsic effects.

The pivotal inference in the modal collapse argument involves substituting “God’s act of creation” for “God” in the necessarily true premise, “Necessarily, God exists.” This move is intended to yield the conclusion, “Necessarily, God’s act of creation exists”.11 However, this is a textbook example of a modal fallacy. As Quine famously demonstrated, substitution based on a true identity statement is not always truth-preserving within a modal context (i.e., within the scope of an operator like “necessarily,” symbolized as
◻).11
Quine’s classic example illustrates the error perfectly:

Necessarily, 9 is greater than 7. (◻(9>7))
The number of planets = 9. (A true, but contingent, identity statement at the time).
Therefore, necessarily, the number of planets is greater than 7. (◻(The number of planets>7))

The conclusion is clearly false, as there are possible worlds with fewer than eight planets. The inference fails because the term “the number of planets” is a non-rigid designator; it refers to different numbers in different possible worlds. In contrast, “9” is a rigid designator; it refers to the same number in all possible worlds.11 One cannot validly substitute a non-rigid designator for a rigid one within a modal context and expect to preserve truth.

#5.2 The Crucial Role of Rigid and Non-Rigid Designators

Applying this logical principle to the modal collapse argument reveals its fatal flaw. The term “God,” in classical theism, is a rigid designator, referring to the same necessary being in every possible world. However, the term “God’s act of creation” is a non-rigid or, more precisely, a contingently designating term.12 It successfully refers to God’s act only in those possible worlds where God actually creates. In possible worlds where God refrains from creating, the term “God’s act of creation” refers to nothing at all.
Therefore, the identity statement “God = God’s act of creation” is not a necessary identity true in all possible worlds. It is a contingent identity, true only in the actual world and other worlds where God creates this universe. Because the identity is contingent, it is logically illicit to use it to perform a substitution within the scope of the necessity operator in the premise ◻(God exists). The core step of the modal collapse argument is thus formally invalid.11

#5.3 Distinguishing God’s Act in se from its Effects ad extra

Classical defenders of DDS have always maintained a crucial distinction between God’s single, simple, eternal act in se (as it is in Himself) and the contingent, temporal effects of that act ad extra (outside Himself). God’s act, which is identical with His essence, is indeed necessary. However, the creation that results from it is contingent. This requires that the causal link between God’s act and its effect is not one of deterministic necessity.
To avert the collapse, the defender of DDS can hold that God’s necessary act indeterministically produces its contingent effects.12 This “Biconditional Solution” posits that God’s freedom is expressed in the fact that His act does not necessitate its effects. This preserves both the necessity of God’s nature and the genuine contingency of the created world. The modal collapse argument wrongly assumes a necessitarian link between cause and effect, a premise the classical theist is not required to accept.12
The following table provides a formal analysis of the argument and its refutation.

Table 1: Logical Analysis of the Modal Collapse Argument and Its Refutation
The Modal Collapse Argument (Simplified Form)
P1. ◻(God exists).
P2. God = God’s act of creation. (Premise from DDS)
C1. ∴◻(God’s act of creation exists). (From P1, P2, by Leibniz’s Law)
P3. ◻(If God’s act of creation exists, then the universe exists). (Causal necessitarianism)
C2. ∴◻(The universe exists). (From C1, P3, by modal logic)
The Refutation 11
Critique of the inference to C1: This inference is invalid. It commits a modal fallacy. For the substitution to be valid, the identity in P2 must be a necessary identity. However, “God’s act of creation” is a non-rigid designator—it designates God’s act only in possible worlds where a creation exists. “God” is a rigid designator. The identity is contingent, not necessary. Therefore, one cannot substitute it within the scope of the necessity operator (◻).
Critique of P3: This premise can be denied. The classical theist can hold that the connection between God’s act and its effects is one of free, and possibly indeterministic, causation. God’s necessary act does not necessitate its contingent effects. This is the “Biconditional Solution” mentioned in.12

This rigorous analysis demonstrates that the modal collapse argument fails on purely logical grounds. It does not expose a flaw in Divine Simplicity but rather relies on a flawed application of modal logic. The high cost of the objection becomes clear: to make it work, the objector would have to reject the standard, well-established rules of modal logic governing substitution, a move that would have devastating consequences for reasoning about necessity and possibility in any field.11

#Part III: Arguments Concerning God, Morality, and Evil

#Section 6. On Divine Immutability: A Refutation of the Conflict Between Changelessness and Divine Interaction

#New Thesis: The Incoherence of an Unchanging, Interactive God

The classical doctrine of strong divine immutability posits that God is wholly unchanging in His essential being, perfections, character, and purposes.14 The new thesis argues that this conception of a static, changeless deity is logically incompatible with the biblical and philosophical requirements for a God who genuinely interacts with the world. A God who answers prayer, enters into covenants, responds to human actions, and is described with emotive language (e.g., love, wrath, grief) is necessarily a God who changes in relation to His creation. Therefore, the classical doctrine of strong immutability renders the concept of God incoherent, forcing a choice between a changeless but inert “philosopher’s God” and a changing but biblically recognizable God.16

#New Antithesis: Reconciling Immutability and Interaction via the Intrinsic/Extrinsic Distinction

This objection rests on a failure to appreciate a crucial philosophical distinction: the difference between an intrinsic (or ontological) change and an extrinsic (or relational) change. The doctrine of divine immutability asserts that God is unchanging in His intrinsic properties—His perfect essence, knowledge, and will. It does not entail that God cannot enter into new relationships with a changing creation. By properly understanding this distinction, it becomes clear that God’s immutability is not only compatible with divine interaction but is, in fact, the necessary foundation for a trustworthy and reliable God.

#6.1 The Philosophical Foundations of Immutability: Perfection and Simplicity

The doctrine of immutability is not an arbitrary or isolated attribute but a logical corollary of other core divine perfections, primarily God’s perfection, simplicity, and aseity (self-sufficiency).14

Perfection: A being that is maximally perfect cannot change. A change would either be for the better or for the worse. If God changed for the better, it would imply He was previously imperfect. If He changed for the worse, He would cease to be perfect. Both are logically impossible for a perfect being.16
Simplicity: As a simple being, God is not composed of parts that can be altered, added, or subtracted.11 Change requires a composition of act and potency—a potential to be different that is then actualized. As
actus purus (pure actuality), God has no unactualized potentials and therefore cannot change.13
Aseity: God’s existence is self-sufficient and independent. Change is typically caused by an external influence or an internal development. An independent being is not subject to external causes, and a perfect, fully actualized being undergoes no internal development.14

#6.2 The Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Change Distinction

The core of the refutation lies in clarifying that immutability applies to God’s intrinsic being, not His extrinsic relations.15 An intrinsic change is a change in the actual properties or nature of a thing. An extrinsic change is merely a change in how a thing is related to something else that has changed.
A classic analogy is that of a stone pillar. The pillar itself remains intrinsically unchanged when a person walks past it. However, its relational properties change: at one moment it is “to the right of the person,” and at the next, it is “to the left of the person.” The change is real, but it is not in the pillar; it is in the system comprising the pillar and the person. Similarly, when the created world changes, God’s relationship to it is described differently from our temporal perspective, but God Himself undergoes no intrinsic modification. When a sinner repents, God does not change from wrathful to merciful; rather, the sinner changes their relationship to God’s eternal and unchanging dispositions of justice and mercy.

#6.3 Reinterpreting Divine Action and Emotion in Time

From this distinction, the alleged contradictions dissolve.

Divine Action: God’s “actions” in time are not a sequence of new decisions for Him. They are the temporal unfolding of a single, eternal, and unchanging act of divine will. God’s eternal decree encompasses the entirety of history, so His actions are not reactive or sequential from His atemporal perspective. He eternally wills the creation of a dynamic, changing world, and His one act grounds all events within it.
Divine Emotion: Biblical descriptions of God “repenting” (Genesis 6:6), being “grieved” 18, or changing His mind are widely understood, even within classical theology, as anthropomorphic and analogical language.18 They are accommodations to human understanding, describing the effects of God’s unchanging will from a human, temporal viewpoint. As Wayne Grudem’s definition, cited in 14, clarifies, “God is unchanging in his being, perfection, purpose and promise, yet God acts and feels emotion, and God acts and feels differently in response to different situations.” This is not a contradiction but a description of how a constant, unchanging character (God) relates to a variable subject (creation). God’s unchanging hatred of sin is experienced as “wrath” by the unrepentant and His unchanging love of righteousness is experienced as “favor” by the repentant. The change is in the creature, not the Creator.

#6.4 Immutability as the Foundation for Divine Reliability

Far from being a cold and distant philosophical abstraction, divine immutability is the very anchor of religious faith and trust. A god who could change his mind, alter his promises, or modify his essential character would be unpredictable and ultimately untrustworthy.14 The steadfastness of God’s covenants and the reliability of His salvific plan depend entirely on the fact that He is “the same yesterday and today and forever” (Hebrews 13:8). His immutability is the metaphysical guarantee of His faithfulness. The objection, therefore, seeks to dismantle the very attribute that makes the God of theism worthy of worship and trust.

#Section 7. On the Euthyphro Dilemma: A Refutation of the “False Trilemma” Objection

#New Thesis: The Recalcitrant Trilemma

The classic Euthyphro dilemma asks: “Is something pious because the gods love it, or do the gods love it because it is pious?” In its modern form, it asks: “Does God will something because it is good, or is something good because God wills it?”.19 The standard theistic response posits a third option: God wills something because He
is good; His nature is the standard of goodness.19 The new thesis argues that this is not a genuine solution but merely a deferral of the problem, creating a new and inescapable trilemma concerning God’s nature 21:

Did God choose His own nature?
a. If yes, and He had a reason for His choice, then that reason is the ultimate standard of goodness, independent of God.
b. If yes, and He had no reason, then His nature is arbitrary, and so is morality.
If God did not choose His own nature, then He is subject to a nature He did not create and cannot change, making Him no more the source of morality than a robot following its programming.
In every case, the grounding of morality in God is shown to be either arbitrary or dependent on an external standard.

#New Antithesis: Dissolving the Trilemma through Metaphysical Necessity

The “new trilemma” is a philosophical confusion arising from a fundamental category error. It treats God’s nature as if it were a contingent property that could be “chosen,” “caused,” or “imposed,” when classical theism defines God as a necessary being whose attributes are metaphysically necessary. God’s goodness is neither chosen by Him nor imposed upon Him; it is identical with His necessary essence. The trilemma dissolves when the proper metaphysical status of God is understood.

#7.1 The Category Error of Contingent Predication

The entire trilemma is built on the faulty assumption that God’s nature is a contingent state of affairs that requires an explanation in terms of choice or external constraint. This is a profound category error. For classical theism, God is ipsum esse subsistens (the sheer act of being itself) and, as such, is a necessary being.21 His essential attributes, including His perfect goodness, are not properties He
has in the way a human has properties; they are what He is. They are necessary, not contingent.
One cannot sensibly ask if God “chose” to be good any more than one can ask if a triangle “chose” to have three sides or if the number 2 “chose” to be even. These properties are part of the essential definition of the thing itself. The question “Why is God good?” is ill-posed because it seeks a cause or reason for a necessary state of affairs. God’s nature is the ultimate metaphysical stopping point; it is uncaused and self-explanatory.

#7.2 God as the Ultimate, Non-Arbitrary Standard

The solution to the original Euthyphro dilemma is that God’s nature is the standard of goodness.19 This is not an external standard to which God conforms, but an internal one that is identical with His very being. The standards by which God acts are therefore
descriptive of His nature, not prescriptive for Him.22 This immediately dissolves the horns of the new trilemma:

It is not arbitrary: The charge of arbitrariness only holds if God could have been otherwise. Since God’s nature is metaphysically necessary and immutable, He could not have willed that hatred be good or cruelty be virtuous. Such acts would contradict His essential character, which is necessarily loving, just, and kind.19 Morality is therefore grounded in the most stable, necessary, and non-arbitrary reality possible: the divine nature itself.
It is not independent: The standard is not external to God, so He is not “subject” to it. He does not consult some platonic “Form of the Good” before acting; He simply acts in accordance with His own nature.22

#7.3 The Connection to Divine Simplicity and the Tautology Charge

The objection that identifying God’s nature with the good reduces to a useless tautology (“God’s nature is based on God’s nature”) 23 misunderstands the claim’s metaphysical import. The statement is not an explanation within a causal series but a statement of ontological identity. It signifies that the explanatory chain for what “goodness” is terminates in the character of the ultimate being. Goodness is defined by its correspondence to the being of God.23
This solution is deeply intertwined with the doctrine of Divine Simplicity. If God is His attributes, then God is Goodness. The dilemma presupposes a distinction between God and the property of “goodness,” which DDS denies.11 The solution is therefore not an ad hoc maneuver but a direct consequence of a central tenet of classical theology, demonstrating the systematic coherence of theistic doctrine.

#7.4 Axiological vs. Deontological Goodness

Finally, the objection can be further refined by introducing a distinction between axiological (value-based) and deontological (duty-based) goodness.22 God’s goodness is primarily axiological: He is the locus and standard of all value. Moral duties, or deontological claims (“one ought to do X”), apply to free creatures who can either conform to or deviate from the good. God, being the Good itself, does not have “duties” or “obligations” in this sense. He cannot fail to be Himself. Applying the language of “rules,” “control,” and “choice” to God’s necessary nature, as the trilemma does 21, is to inappropriately project the moral situation of contingent creatures onto the necessary being who is the very ground of morality.

#Section 8. On Original Sin: A Refutation of the Charge of Collective Injustice

#New Thesis: The Inherent Injustice of Inherited Guilt

The doctrine of Original Sin, in its classical formulation, asserts that all of humanity inherits a state of sinfulness and guilt from the transgression of the first man, Adam.24 The new thesis raises a profound moral objection: this doctrine is fundamentally unjust. It appears to violate the core principles of individual responsibility by holding people morally culpable, condemned, and corrupted for a crime they did not personally commit.25 To punish a child for the sin of a distant ancestor seems to be a “logical absurdity” and a form of collective punishment that is irreconcilable with the concept of a just and loving God.

#New Antithesis: The Justice of Covenantal Headship and the Explanation of a Fallen Nature

This moral objection, while powerful from a modern individualistic perspective, misunderstands the theological-legal framework of covenantal (or federal) headship in which the doctrine is situated. Original Sin is not primarily about assigning personal guilt for Adam’s specific act but about providing a coherent explanation for the universal human condition of a corrupted nature (concupiscence) and spiritual alienation from God. The justice of its central mechanism—imputation through a representative—is affirmed by its direct parallel to the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, which is the foundation of salvation.

#8.1 The Principle of Federal Headship

The biblical defense of Original Sin rests on the concept of corporate solidarity and representative headship. In this framework, Adam acted not merely as an individual but as the “federal head” or covenantal representative of the entire human race.24 His actions, performed in this representative capacity, therefore have legal and ontological consequences for all those he represents. This concept is not as alien as it may seem to modern sensibilities. It is reflected in various secular legal and social structures where the actions of a representative (a head of state, a legal guardian) have binding consequences for the group they represent. From a biblical perspective, which often views humanity as a collective group before God, Adam’s role as representative is central.25

#8.2 The Crucial Parallelism with Christ’s Righteousness

The coherence and justice of this principle are most clearly seen in its soteriological parallel, which the Apostle Paul explicitly draws in Romans 5:12–21. This passage forms the bedrock of the doctrine.24 Paul contrasts two representative heads: Adam and Christ. He argues: “Therefore, as one trespass led to condemnation for all men, so one act of righteousness leads to justification and life for all men” (Romans 5:18).
This parallelism is the key to refuting the injustice charge. The very same principle of imputation that grounds the transmission of sin from Adam also grounds the transmission of righteousness from Christ. If one rejects the justice of being condemned in Adam, one must, to be logically consistent, also reject the justice of being saved in Christ. One cannot accept the “credit” of Christ’s righteousness being imputed to one’s account while rejecting the “debit” of Adam’s sin. The doctrine of original sin, far from being an oppressive anomaly, establishes the very principle of covenant headship by which salvation is made possible.24

#8.3 Distinguishing Inherited Corruption from Personal Guilt

A critical clarification is the distinction between what is inherited and what is personally committed. The doctrine teaches that what all people inherit from Adam is not primarily the personal guilt for the specific act of eating the forbidden fruit. Rather, what is transmitted is a corrupted moral and spiritual nature—an innate inclination toward sin and selfishness, theologically termed concupiscence.24 We are born with a nature that is alienated from God and bent toward evil.
Therefore, we are not condemned for what Adam did, but for what we are by nature (“children of wrath,” Ephesians 2:3) and for the personal sins that we inevitably commit as a result of this fallen nature.24 The doctrine’s primary function is thus explanatory: it provides a reason for the empirically verifiable and universal reality of human sinfulness. It explains
why all people, without exception, sin. We sin because we are sinners by nature.24

#8.4 The Doctrine’s Resilience in Non-Literal Interpretations

Even for those who interpret the story of Adam and Eve as a parable or myth rather than literal history, the core truth of the doctrine can be maintained.28 In this view, the Genesis narrative serves as a divinely inspired archetype revealing a profound truth about the human condition: humanity is universally fallen, morally broken, and spiritually alienated from its creator. The “inheritance” is understood not as a biological transmission from a single progenitor, but as the universal spiritual and social condition into which all humans are born.28 The story diagnoses the universal plight that necessitates the universal remedy offered in Christ. Whether historical or archetypal, the narrative’s point remains the same: humanity is in a state of sin from which it cannot rescue itself, setting the stage for the necessity of divine grace. As the philosopher Blaise Pascal observed, original sin is a mystery that shocks our reason, yet without it, we have no true knowledge of ourselves.25

#Section 9. On Total Depravity: A Refutation of the Charge of Empirical Falsification and Moral Incoherence

#New Thesis: The Empirical and Moral Failure of Total Depravity

The doctrine of Total Depravity, a cornerstone of Reformed theology, asserts that as a result of the Fall, every part of human nature—mind, will, and emotions—is corrupted by sin, rendering unregenerate humans incapable of doing anything that is genuinely pleasing to God or of choosing to turn to God for salvation on their own.29 The new thesis objects to this on two grounds. First, it is empirically false: we observe non-Christians performing acts of kindness, self-sacrifice, and creating works of great beauty and truth. Second, it is morally incoherent: if humans are so depraved that they cannot choose good, then they cannot be held morally responsible for their failure to do so. This seems to make God unjust for condemning people for an inability He decreed.

#New Antithesis: Clarifying Total Depravity as Total Inability and its Coherence within a Compatibilist Framework

This objection is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of what the doctrine of Total Depravity asserts. It does not mean that fallen humans are as evil as they could possibly be (a position better termed “utter depravity”) or that they are incapable of performing acts that are good by civic or social standards. Rather, it asserts a total inability in the spiritual realm: the inability of the unregenerate will to submit to God or to perform any act out of a genuine, God-glorifying motive. When correctly understood and paired with the concepts of common grace and compatibilist free will, the doctrine is both empirically plausible and morally coherent.

#9.1 Defining Total Depravity as Total Inability, Not Utter Depravity

The term “total” in Total Depravity refers to the extent of sin’s corruption, not its intensity. Sin has affected every part of human nature—the intellect is darkened, the heart is deceitful, and the will is in bondage to sin.29 The doctrine does not deny that unregenerate people can be kind to their families, be honest in business, or create beautiful art. C.S. Lewis’s critique that the doctrine must be false because people are not as bad as they could be misses the point; the doctrine never claimed they were.29
The core of the doctrine is that because of this pervasive corruption, no action performed by a fallen person can be radically or ultimately good, because it does not flow from a heart that loves and seeks to glorify God. Before a holy God, even our “righteous acts are like filthy rags” (Isaiah 64:6) because their ultimate motive is rooted in self-interest, pride, or some standard other than God’s glory.30 The inability is specifically spiritual: the unregenerate person is “dead in… transgressions and sins” (Ephesians 2:1), and a dead person cannot make themselves alive or respond to spiritual stimuli without a divine intervention of grace.29

#9.2 The Role of Common Grace in Explaining Civic Goodness

How, then, do we account for the observable civic and social good performed by non-believers? Reformed theology explains this through the doctrine of Common Grace. Common grace is the grace of God that is common to all humankind, regenerate and unregenerate alike. It is the non-saving, restraining influence of God’s Spirit in the world that prevents sin from running its full course, preserves a measure of order and beauty in society, and enables fallen people to achieve good in the civil, artistic, and intellectual spheres. It is God’s common grace that allows for stable governments, scientific discoveries, acts of philanthropy, and familial love, even in a fallen world. This doctrine allows the theologian to affirm both the radical spiritual inability of fallen humanity and the empirical reality of relative human goodness.

#9.3 Compatibilism, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility

The charge that total depravity eliminates moral responsibility is answered by the philosophical position of compatibilism (or “soft determinism”).31 Compatibilism holds that free will and determinism are compatible. It defines a free act not as an uncaused choice (the libertarian view), but as an act where a person chooses according to their greatest desire or inclination, without external coercion.31 A person is free when they are doing what they want to do.
In this framework, the unregenerate person is still morally responsible because they sin freely—that is, they sin because they want to sin. Their actions flow directly from their own corrupted desires and nature. Their will is not externally forced; it is internally determined by their own sinful inclinations.31 As Jesus taught, a bad tree cannot bear good fruit; it freely and naturally produces fruit according to its nature (Matthew 7:18). The unregenerate person is held responsible not for having a nature they did not choose, but for the sinful choices they willingly and freely make in accordance with that nature.33 God does not force the evil inclination upon them; rather, He “gave them over” to the depraved mind that they themselves chose in their rebellion (Romans 1:28).31
Thus, when properly defined, Total Depravity is not empirically falsified, because common grace explains civic good. And it is not morally incoherent, because a compatibilist understanding of freedom preserves moral responsibility for choices that flow from one’s own nature.

#Section 10. On the Free Will Defense: A Refutation of its Inadequacy in the Face of Natural Evil

#New Thesis: The Failure of the Free Will Defense to Address Natural Evil

The Free Will Defense (FWD) is a prominent theodicy that seeks to resolve the logical problem of evil by arguing that God’s creation of creatures with significant free will is a good of such immense value that it outweighs the evil that results from the misuse of that freedom.34 The new thesis argues that while the FWD might plausibly account for
moral evil (evil caused by the free actions of agents), it is utterly powerless to explain natural evil—the suffering caused by natural disasters, diseases, predatory animals, and other non-agential processes. Since an omnipotent God could have created a world with free creatures but without gratuitous natural evils like earthquakes, tsunamis, or cancers, the existence of such suffering remains a powerful piece of evidence against the existence of a good and all-powerful God. The FWD, therefore, only solves half the problem at best.36

#New Antithesis: The Interconnectedness of Natural Order and Moral Freedom

This objection misconstrues the scope and function of the Free Will Defense and wrongly assumes that moral and natural evil can be neatly separated. The FWD is primarily a defense against the logical problem of evil concerning free creatures, not a complete theodicy for all suffering. However, the very conditions necessary for a world in which free will can be meaningfully exercised—a stable, predictable environment governed by natural laws—are the same conditions that give rise to the possibility of natural evil. Therefore, natural evil can be understood as a necessary byproduct of the greater good of a law-like universe, which is itself a prerequisite for the greater good of moral freedom.

#10.1 The Proper Scope of the Free Will Defense

It is crucial to recognize that the FWD, as classically formulated by philosophers like Alvin Plantinga, is a defense, not a theodicy. A theodicy attempts to give the actual reason why God permits evil. A defense merely aims to show that the existence of God and the existence of evil are not logically contradictory, by positing a possible reason.35 The FWD’s primary target is moral evil. It argues that to create creatures capable of moral good, God must create creatures capable of moral evil. He cannot cause them to freely do only what is right, as this would be a contradiction in terms.35 The FWD successfully shows that it is at least logically possible that God had a good reason for permitting moral evil. The objection that it does not also explain natural evil is therefore a category error; it criticizes the defense for not doing something it was never intended to do.

#10.2 The “Stable Environment” Theodicy for Natural Evil

A separate but complementary argument can be made for the existence of natural evil. For free agents to exist, make meaningful choices, and see those choices have predictable consequences, they must exist in a stable, orderly environment governed by consistent natural laws. A world where God constantly intervenes to prevent every natural harm—stopping every rockslide, neutralizing every virus, redirecting every lightning bolt—would be a world without regularity or predictability. In such a world, science would be impossible, and rational action would be undermined, as there would be no reliable connection between cause and effect.
The very laws of physics, geology, and biology that make life possible are the same laws that, in their regular operation, can lead to events we perceive as natural evils. Plate tectonics, which recycles minerals and regulates the climate, also causes earthquakes and volcanoes. Biological evolution, which produces the diversity of life, involves processes of competition and predation. Cell division, which allows for growth and healing, also carries the risk of cancerous mutation. God could not eliminate the possibility of these natural evils without eliminating the stable, law-like system that is the necessary backdrop for the existence of free, embodied agents.

#10.3 The Interconnection of Moral and Natural Evil

Furthermore, the distinction between moral and natural evil is often blurry. A great deal of what passes for natural evil is either directly caused or greatly exacerbated by human moral evil or negligence.37 Famines are often caused by unjust distribution of resources or political conflict. The devastating effects of a hurricane can be magnified by poor building codes or the destruction of natural coastal defenses. The spread of disease can be accelerated by a lack of sanitation or healthcare access. In these cases, the suffering is not purely “natural” but is deeply intertwined with the misuse of human free will.

#10.4 The Soul-Making Potential of a Challenging World

Finally, complementing the “stable environment” argument is the Irenaean or “soul-making” theodicy (to be explored further in Section 11). This view posits that a world with challenges, dangers, and struggles is a better environment for the development of moral and spiritual virtues like courage, compassion, perseverance, and faith than a perfectly safe, hedonistic paradise would be. The existence of natural evils provides the context in which such virtues can be forged. While this does not justify every instance of suffering, it suggests that a world entirely free of natural adversity might be a world deprived of the opportunity for the highest forms of moral development. Thus, the existence of natural evil is not a gratuitous flaw but a necessary feature of a world designed for the greater goods of both meaningful freedom and moral growth.

#Section 11. On Animal Suffering: A Refutation of the Claim that it Constitutes Gratuitous, Undefeated Evil

#New Thesis: Animal Suffering as Conclusive Evidence Against Theism

The existence of immense and apparently pointless suffering in the animal kingdom, spanning hundreds of millions of years, presents a severe challenge to theism. “Nature, red in tooth and claw,” with its cycles of predation, parasitism, disease, and starvation, seems to be a world designed with suffering built into its very fabric.38 Unlike human suffering, animal pain cannot be justified by appeals to free will, original sin (as they are not moral agents), or soul-making (as they are not believed to possess rational souls capable of moral development).40 The suffering of a fawn burning to death in a forest fire, for example, appears to be a clear case of horrendous, gratuitous evil that a good and powerful God could and should have prevented.38 This makes the sheer scale and nature of animal suffering powerful evidence against the existence of God.

#New Antithesis: Re-framing Animal Suffering Through Metaphysical Distinctions and Eschatological Hope

The argument from animal suffering derives its force from an anthropomorphic projection of human-level consciousness onto animals and a myopic, purely terrestrial perspective that ignores the possibility of eschatological resolution. A robust theistic response can be constructed by, first, making a crucial Thomistic distinction between pain and suffering, which qualifies the nature of the evil, and second, by positing a broader redemptive plan in which animal suffering is not the final word but is ultimately defeated and compensated for in an afterlife.

#11.1 The Thomistic Distinction Between Pain and Suffering

A Thomistic approach begins by defining evil as a privation, a lack of a good that ought to be present.41 The objection is that pain seems to be a positive reality, not a privation. The Thomistic response is to analyze the function of pain. Pain is a “passive psychological state” that serves a crucial, metaphysically
good purpose: it signals harm to an organism and motivates it to preserve its own being.41 A nervous system that functions properly to produce the sensation of pain is a good for the animal; an animal incapable of feeling pain would be far worse off, unable to avoid injury or predation.41
Furthermore, Thomistic philosophy distinguishes between the biological sensation of pain (dolor) and the higher-order, self-aware, and psychologically complex experience of suffering that is unique to rational beings like humans. While animals experience pain, they are generally held to lack the self-reflective consciousness, episodic memory, and conceptual understanding of their own mortality that transform pain into the existential anguish of human suffering.41 The fawn in the fire experiences real pain, but it does not contemplate its own tragic fate or despair over a life unlived in the way a human would. While this does not eliminate the evil, it qualifies its intensity and refutes the idea that animal and human suffering are morally equivalent.

#11.2 The Greater Good of a Law-Like Creation

As argued in the previous section, a world governed by consistent natural laws is a great good, necessary for the existence of any kind of complex life, including free agents. The evolutionary processes that give rise to the diversity and complexity of the animal kingdom—processes that include competition, predation, and death—are part of this law-like structure. God’s choice was not between this world and a world with no animal pain, but between this world with its interconnected ecosystem and no biological world at all. The existence of a vibrant, dynamic creation is a greater good that plausibly justifies the existence of the painful processes inherent within it.38

#11.3 Eschatological Defeat and Compensation

The most powerful component of the theistic response is eschatological. The objection assumes that an animal’s life, from birth to death, is the totality of its existence. Theism is not bound by this naturalistic assumption. Several theologians have argued that God’s justice and love for all His creatures demand an afterlife for animals where their undeserved earthly suffering is defeated and compensated.38

Compensation: God can grant animals an experience of everlasting joy in a renewed creation that so far outweighs their temporal pain that their existence as a whole becomes a great good for them. The finite suffering of earth would “pale in comparison to everlasting joy”.38
Defeat: More than just compensation, God can defeat the evil of their suffering by integrating it into a greater good within the animal’s own life story. In the afterlife, God could reveal to the creature how its suffering contributed to a greater purpose, or allow it to experience a deeper appreciation of heavenly joy because of the contrast with earthly pain.38

This eschatological perspective, which is consistent with biblical affirmations of God’s love for all creatures and a final restoration of all things (Genesis 9, Psalm 104, Isaiah 11), reframes the problem entirely.38 The suffering of the fawn is not a pointless, final tragedy, but a temporary evil that God, in His justice and love, will ultimately redeem and defeat. While we cannot see this full picture from our limited vantage point, if we have independent reasons to believe in a good and loving God, we have reason to trust that He has a just resolution for all His creatures.41

#Part IV: Arguments Concerning Divine Knowledge and Action

#Section 12. On Skeptical Theism: A Refutation of the Charge that it Leads to Moral Skepticism

#New Thesis: The Corrosive Skepticism of Skeptical Theism

Skeptical Theism (ST) is a response to the evidential problem of evil which argues that due to the vast cognitive gap between humans and God, we are in no position to judge that apparently gratuitous evils (like the fawn in the fire) are truly gratuitous. For all we know, God may have a morally sufficient reason for permitting such evils that is beyond our comprehension.42 The new thesis objects that this move, while seemingly defusing the problem of evil, comes at an unacceptable cost: it leads to a corrosive and widespread moral and religious skepticism. If we cannot know God’s reasons for permitting evil, then we cannot make any reasonable judgments about what God would do in
any situation. This would undermine our ability to trust in God’s goodness, to believe His promises as revealed in scripture, or to have a meaningful personal relationship with Him. ST thus saves theism from the problem of evil only by making theism unknowable and unrelatable.42

#New Antithesis: Defining the Proper Scope of Skeptical Theism

This objection fundamentally misrepresents the scope and nature of Skeptical Theism. ST does not advocate for global skepticism about God’s character or actions. Rather, it applies a principled epistemic humility to a very specific and limited domain: our ability to discern God’s all-things-considered justifying reasons for permitting specific instances of evil. ST is perfectly compatible with having warranted beliefs about God’s revealed moral character and purposes. The objection creates a false dichotomy between knowing everything about God’s reasons and knowing nothing at all.

#12.1 The Core Argument and Limited Scope of ST

The core argument of ST is a critique of the “noseeum” inference used in arguments from evil.43 The argument from evil often relies on the inference: “I can’t see any good reason for God to permit this evil, therefore, there likely is no good reason”.42 Skeptical theists argue this inference is weak. Given God’s omniscience, it is highly probable that His understanding of the complex web of causal connections and the full range of possible goods and evils far surpasses our own. Therefore, our failure to perceive a justifying good is not strong evidence for its absence.43
This is a claim about our cognitive limitations concerning the specifics of God’s providential plan. It is not a claim that we are ignorant of God’s moral character. Theism, particularly Christian theism, holds that God has given us positive reasons to believe He is good through divine revelation (e.g., scripture, the life of Christ). ST argues that this positive evidence for God’s goodness should not be overturned by our inability to solve specific puzzles about providence, an inability we should expect given our finite minds.

#12.2 Distinguishing Between “What God Would Do” and “Why God Permits X”

The objection that ST prevents us from making “reasonable judgements about what God would do” 42 equivocates. ST only claims we cannot make reasonable judgments about the proposition: “There is no God-justifying reason for evil X.” It does not prevent us from making reasonable judgments about propositions like: “God would not lie,” “God will keep His promises,” or “God commands us to love our neighbor.”
A perfect God would be incapable of lying or acting contrary to His revealed moral will.42 We can have warranted belief in these claims based on the coherence of the divine nature and divine revelation. The skeptical theist’s position is that it is
not contrary to God’s perfect nature to permit an evil if that evil is necessary for a greater good that we cannot comprehend. There is no contradiction between affirming “God is good” and “I don’t know the specific good that justifies this particular suffering.”

#12.3 The Parent Analogy

A helpful way to understand this distinction is the parent-child analogy.43 A young child may be utterly baffled and distressed by her parent’s decision to allow her to undergo a painful surgery. From her limited perspective, the act seems gratuitously cruel. She cannot comprehend the concepts of disease, anesthesia, or long-term health. Her inability to see the justifying reason does not mean one does not exist, nor does it mean she should descend into global skepticism about whether her parents love her, especially if she has overwhelming evidence of their love and care in other contexts. Similarly, our cognitive position relative to God is arguably analogous to, or even more limited than, the child’s position relative to the parent. We should therefore expect that some of His providential decisions will be inscrutable to us, without this undermining our warranted belief in His overall goodness.

#12.4 ST as Epistemic Humility, Not Fideism

Ultimately, ST is not a retreat into blind faith (fideism) but an exercise in proper epistemic humility. It recognizes the limits of human reason when confronted with a being defined as omniscient. It argues that the evidential problem of evil gains its force only by making an epistemically arrogant assumption: that if God has a good reason for permitting evil, it would necessarily be a reason that is accessible to the human mind. ST challenges this hidden premise. It does not ask us to abandon reason, but to reason correctly about our own cognitive limits. Therefore, it does not lead to global skepticism but to a more rationally stable and epistemically humble theism.

#Section 13. On the Eternal Perspective: A Refutation of the Charge that it Nullifies Temporal Suffering

#New Thesis: The Insignificance of an Eternal Afterlife for Present Suffering

A common theistic response to the problem of evil is to appeal to an eternal perspective. This view, often drawing on passages like 2 Corinthians 4:17, suggests that our present afflictions are “light and momentary” when compared to the “eternal weight of glory” that awaits believers in the afterlife.44 The new thesis objects that this perspective is morally and emotionally inadequate. It risks trivializing or nullifying the profound reality of present suffering. Telling someone in the midst of excruciating pain or devastating loss that their suffering is a mere “moment” can seem callous and dismissive. An infinite future reward does not erase the reality of a finite but horrific present. Therefore, the appeal to an eternal perspective is not a solution to the problem of evil but an evasion of it.

#New Antithesis: The Eternal Perspective as Re-contextualization, Not Nullification

This objection misunderstands the function of the eternal perspective. It is not intended to nullify or deny the reality and horror of temporal suffering, but to re-contextualize it, providing the hope, meaning, and endurance necessary to face it without despair. The argument does not claim that suffering is not bad, but that it is not the final or ultimate reality. By situating finite suffering within the framework of an infinite and glorious future, theism provides a rational basis for hope and perseverance that is unavailable to a purely materialistic worldview.

#13.1 Affirming the Reality of Suffering

The theistic appeal to eternity does not begin by denying the severity of suffering. The Apostle Paul, who penned the “light and momentary” passage, provided a harrowing list of his own sufferings, including beatings, stonings, shipwrecks, and constant danger.44 His perspective was not born of a life of comfort but of extreme hardship. The argument acknowledges the full weight of present evil but refuses to grant it the final word. The contrast is not between “real suffering” and “unreal suffering,” but between “temporary suffering” and “eternal glory”.44

#13.2 The Power of Re-contextualization

The core of the antithesis is the power of context to alter meaning. An event’s significance is determined by its place in a larger narrative. For example, the intense pain and struggle of a marathon runner is not nullified, but it is given meaning and purpose by the goal of finishing the race. The pain of a difficult surgery is made bearable by the context of future health.
The eternal perspective provides the ultimate re-contextualization. It frames our entire earthly life, with all its joys and sorrows, as a brief and preparatory stage for an eternal existence. From this vantage point, suffering is not a meaningless intrusion into a meaningless life, but a temporary and purposeful part of a journey toward an infinitely good destination. As the psalmist Asaph realized, his perspective on suffering was transformed when he “entered the sanctuary of God” and viewed his temporary struggles in light of the ultimate destinies of both the righteous and the wicked.44

#13.3 The Contrast Between Finite and Infinite

The argument’s logic rests on the mathematical and metaphysical contrast between the finite and the infinite. Any finite quantity, no matter how large, becomes negligible when compared to an infinite one. While our suffering can feel all-encompassing from within our finite temporal experience, from an eternal standpoint, its duration is literally zero in comparison to the eternity that follows. Paul’s description of affliction as a “moment” is a statement of its comparative duration relative to eternity. This does not make the pain less real in the moment, but it provides a rational basis for the hope that it will not last and will be overwhelmingly eclipsed by a good of infinite duration and quality. This “eternal weight of glory” is not just a compensation but a transformative reality that gives meaning to the trials that “worked for us” to produce it.44

#13.4 The Alternative: The Despair of a Purely Immanent Frame

The strength of the eternal perspective is best seen when contrasted with its alternative. In a purely materialistic and finite worldview, suffering is not only real but potentially ultimate. For a person whose life is defined by unredeemed agony, their existence is a net negative, a tragedy with no final chapter of resolution. The objection to the eternal perspective implicitly assumes this immanent frame, judging the problem of evil solely on terrestrial terms. But theism explicitly rejects this frame. It posits that reality is larger than our temporal experience. The eternal perspective is therefore not an ad hoc addition to solve a problem, but a core component of the theistic worldview. To dismiss it is to demand that theism solve the problem of evil using only the conceptual resources of atheism, which is an unreasonable demand. Theism offers hope in the face of suffering precisely because it insists that this life is not all there is.

#Section 14. On Divine Foreknowledge: A Refutation of the Incompatibility with Human Free Will via the Boethian Solution

#New Thesis: The Inevitable Conflict Between Omniscience and Freedom

The concepts of divine omniscience and genuine human free will are logically incompatible. If God, being omniscient, has infallible foreknowledge of all future events, including every human choice, then those choices cannot be free. If God has known from eternity that a person will perform action X at time T, then at time T, that person cannot do otherwise than X. The future is “fixed” by God’s prior knowledge, rendering human freedom an illusion and reducing all actions to a form of theological determinism.45 This not only makes humans puppets but also makes God responsible for evil, as He foreknew and thus could have prevented every sinful act.

#New Antithesis: Dissolving the Conflict Through Divine Timelessness

This alleged conflict is a pseudo-problem generated by a fundamental category error: projecting a temporal mode of knowing onto a timeless, eternal being. The Boethian solution, articulated by the 6th-century philosopher Boethius, resolves the paradox by arguing that God is atemporal. He does not “foreknow” events in a temporal sequence; rather, He possesses a simple, complete, and unchanging knowledge of all of history—past, present, and future—in a single, eternal present. Since God’s knowledge is not prior in time to our actions, it does not causally determine them.

#14.1 The Fallacy of Temporal Language

The problem arises from the limitations of human language and conception. We speak of God’s “foreknowledge” because we exist in time and can only conceive of knowing the future by “looking ahead”.46 But this is an anthropomorphism. Boethius argues that God’s mode of being is eternity, which he defines not as everlasting duration in time, but as “the possession of endless life whole and perfect at a single moment”.45 God exists outside the timeline. Therefore, for God, there is no “before” or “after,” only an eternal “now.”
What we call “foreknowledge” is, from God’s perspective, simply knowledge. He sees the entire sweep of history, from beginning to end, not as a sequence of unfolding events but as a complete and present reality.45 His knowledge of what we will do tomorrow is no more a “fore”-knowledge than our knowledge of what we are doing right now.

#14.2 The Distinction Between Observation and Causation

Once God’s knowledge is understood as a timeless, present-tense observation, the charge of determinism dissolves. This is because knowledge of a present event does not cause that event to happen. Boethius uses the analogy of a man watching a chariot race.47 The spectator’s knowledge that a particular chariot is winning at a particular moment does not
cause it to win. The knowledge is a consequence of the event, not its cause.
Similarly, God’s timeless knowledge of our free choices does not compel those choices.46 He knows what we will freely choose because we freely choose it. The causal arrow points from our free act to God’s knowledge, not the other way around. As Boethius puts it, “just as knowledge of things happening now does not imply necessity in their outcomes, so foreknowledge of future things imposes no necessity on their outcomes in the future”.46 The necessity is only a conditional one:
if God knows X will happen, then X will happen. But this does not mean that X happens of necessity. It happens freely, and God’s knowledge infallibly corresponds to that free act.

#14.3 Preserving Moral Responsibility

By demonstrating that divine knowledge is observational rather than causative, the Boethian solution preserves the foundation for genuine human freedom and moral responsibility.46 Our choices are not predetermined by a prior divine decree embedded in God’s knowledge. They are genuinely our own, and we are therefore rightly held accountable for them. This resolves the theological problem that if God’s foreknowledge determines our actions, then God becomes the author of sin, and rewards and punishments are rendered meaningless.45 The Boethian framework allows for both an omniscient God and morally significant human freedom.
The objection that God’s knowledge is incompatible with free will is therefore based on a failure to think through the implications of divine eternity. It incorrectly assumes God is a temporal being, bound by the same sequential mode of existence as His creatures. By correcting this foundational assumption, Boethius shows that the apparent contradiction is not a contradiction at all, but a confusion born of applying temporal categories to a timeless being.46

#Section 15. On the Genesis Flood: A Refutation of the Charge of Unjust Divine Genocide

#New Thesis: The Flood Narrative as a Depiction of Divine Injustice

The Genesis flood narrative (Genesis 6-9), when read straightforwardly, depicts an act of global genocide perpetrated by God. In response to human wickedness, God resolves to “blot out man whom I have created from the face of the ground, man and beast and creeping things and birds of the air” (Genesis 6:7). This act of mass destruction, which includes innocent children and the entire animal kingdom, appears to be an act of disproportionate and unjust collective punishment. It portrays God not as a perfectly just and loving being, but as a wrathful, regretful, and morally capricious deity who overreacts to evil by destroying nearly all life on earth.48

#New Antithesis: A Theological Interpretation of the Flood as Covenantal Judgment and Typological Re-creation

The charge of divine injustice stems from a decontextualized, literalistic reading that ignores the rich theological frameworks of covenant theology and biblical typology in which the narrative is embedded. When interpreted theologically, the flood is not an act of capricious genocide but a profound event of cosmic, covenantal judgment and de-creation/re-creation. The destruction is a just consequence of humanity’s role as the corrupted federal head of creation, and the narrative itself serves as a foundational type, or foreshadowing, of God’s ultimate judgment and salvation.

#15.1 Covenantal Judgment and Corporate Solidarity

From a covenant theology perspective, the created order is not a collection of disconnected individuals but an interconnected whole under the headship of humanity. God’s covenant with creation was established through Adam, its representative. The text states that the reason for the flood was that “all flesh had corrupted their way on the earth” (Genesis 6:12) and the earth was “filled with violence” (Genesis 6:11). Humanity, as the covenant head, had led the entire created order into a state of corruption and rebellion.
In this framework, the judgment on the animal kingdom is not an unjust act against innocent bystanders but a tragic consequence of their covenantal link to their human head.49 Just as the ground was cursed for Adam’s sake (Genesis 3:17), the whole of creation suffers the consequences of humanity’s fall. The flood is thus a judgment on a corrupted
system, a radical “pruning” or purging of a creation that had been systemically defiled by the sin of its appointed stewards.18 The death of the animals is a consequence of human sin, not a direct and unjust act of God against them.50

#15.2 The Flood as De-creation and New Creation

The narrative is deliberately structured with literary parallels to the original creation account in Genesis 1, indicating that the flood is a reversal of creation—a de-creation.51 The “windows of heaven” and “fountains of the great deep” opening (Genesis 7:11) represents a return to the primordial watery chaos of Genesis 1:2. The sending of a “wind” (Hebrew:
ruach) to push back the waters (Genesis 8:1) directly echoes the “Spirit/wind” (ruach) of God hovering over the waters in Genesis 1:2.
This act of de-creation is followed by a new creation. Noah, like a new Adam, emerges from the ark to a cleansed earth. God blesses him and gives him the same commands to “be fruitful and multiply” that were given to Adam (Genesis 9:1; cf. 1:28). This typological structure reframes the flood not as a mere act of destruction, but as a radical, salvific reboot of the entire created order, giving humanity and the world a fresh start.49

#15.3 The Flood as a Type of Final Judgment and Salvation

The New Testament and later Jewish tradition consistently interpret the flood typologically, as a foreshadowing of the final eschatological judgment.51 Jesus compares the coming of the Son of Man to the “days of Noah,” where judgment came suddenly upon an unsuspecting world (Matthew 24:37-39). The Apostle Peter explicitly calls the flood a type of baptism, where eight people were “saved through water” (1 Peter 3:20-21).
This typological lens reveals the narrative’s primary purpose. It is not simply a historical record of a past event but a paradigm for understanding God’s relationship with sin and salvation. It establishes a pattern: universal sin leads to universal judgment, but God in His grace always preserves a righteous remnant (Noah and his family) through a vessel of salvation (the ark), bringing them through the waters of judgment into a new world under a new covenant (the Noahic covenant).49 The flood is therefore not a story of divine injustice, but a foundational story of divine justice, judgment, and grace, which sets the stage for the ultimate fulfillment of this pattern in Christ and His church. God’s action is not that of a genocidal tyrant, but that of a just and merciful judge who, even in the midst of cataclysmic judgment, makes a way for salvation and re-establishes His covenant commitment to His creation.18

#Part V: Arguments Concerning the Nature of Reality

#Section 16. On Revelation and Myth: A Refutation of the Claim that Mythological Borrowing Falsifies Biblical Narratives

#New Thesis: Biblical Narratives as Borrowed Myths

A significant critical objection to the uniqueness and divine origin of biblical narratives, such as the Genesis creation and flood accounts, is that they are not original revelations but are derivative of, and borrowed from, earlier Ancient Near Eastern (ANE) myths. For example, the Genesis flood story shares numerous structural and thematic similarities with the Mesopotamian Epic of Gilgamesh. Critics argue that the Bible is simply one culture’s adaptation of common regional myths, rewritten to fit a monotheistic worldview.52 This “mythological borrowing” demonstrates that these stories are human cultural products, not divinely inspired history, thus falsifying their claim to be unique revelation.

#New Antithesis: Common Archetypes, Polemical Re-writing, and the Uniqueness of Theological Content

The presence of phenomenological similarities between biblical and ANE narratives does not entail a simple “borrowing” that falsifies the biblical account. This conclusion is simplistic and ignores more sophisticated interpretative possibilities. The parallels can be understood as evidence of common cultural archetypes, a shared memory of a real primordial event, or, most importantly, as a deliberate polemical engagement by the biblical authors. The biblical narratives adopt the form of ANE myths precisely to subvert and correct their theological content, thereby asserting the radical distinctiveness of Yahweh and His relationship with creation.

#16.1 Shared Cultural Matrix and Common Archetypes

The ancient Israelites did not exist in a cultural vacuum. They were part of a wider ANE civilization that shared a common pool of symbols, literary forms, and foundational questions about origins, justice, and the divine. It is therefore unsurprising that their literature would engage with these common themes and use familiar narrative structures. To expect the Genesis account to be utterly alien in form to the literature of its time is an anachronistic demand. The similarities may simply reflect a shared cultural thought-world and common human archetypes for understanding catastrophic events like floods or the fundamental nature of creation.53

#16.2 The Possibility of a Common Historical Root

From a historical perspective that does not presuppose the mythical nature of the event, the existence of multiple flood narratives across different cultures (especially in Mesopotamia) could be interpreted not as one borrowing from another, but as multiple, distorted cultural memories of a single, real, cataclysmic event. In this view, the Epic of Gilgamesh and other accounts are corrupted pagan versions of the historical event, while the Genesis account, under divine inspiration, provides the theologically accurate and authoritative record of what happened and why.54 The parallels thus become evidence
for a historical core, not against it.

#16.3 Polemical Theology: Subverting Pagan Myths

The most powerful refutation lies in analyzing the differences between the biblical and ANE accounts, which reveal a deliberate theological polemic. The biblical authors adopt the literary shell of pagan myths in order to critique and replace their theology.

Creation: In the Babylonian Enuma Elish, the world is created out of the violent dismemberment of the goddess Tiamat in a battle between capricious, warring deities. In Genesis 1, a single, transcendent, sovereign God brings the world into being through a peaceful, orderly, and deliberate spoken command. There is no theomachy (war among gods), and creation is declared “very good,” not the byproduct of cosmic violence.
The Flood: In the Epic of Gilgamesh, the gods decide to destroy humanity on a whim, because humans have become too noisy. The decision is capricious and amoral. One god, Ea, secretly helps the hero Utnapishtim survive. In Genesis, God sends the flood as a just and moral judgment on universal human wickedness and violence.52 The decision is judicial, not capricious. Noah is saved not through divine trickery, but because he “found favor in the eyes of the Lord” and is righteous. After the flood, Yahweh establishes an eternal covenant, promising never to destroy the earth in this way again—an act of sovereign grace absent from the Mesopotamian accounts.49

In each case, the biblical narrative uses a familiar story structure to make a radical theological point: the God of Israel is not like the petty, amoral, and immanent gods of the nations. He is one, sovereign, transcendent, just, and merciful. The “borrowing” is not a passive inheritance but an active, polemical re-writing that asserts the uniqueness of Israel’s faith.

#16.4 Revelation Accommodated to Human Culture

Finally, the doctrine of revelation does not require that God communicate in a cultural or literary vacuum. Divine inspiration works through human authors, using their language, culture, and literary conventions to communicate divine truth. It is entirely consistent with a robust view of inspiration that God would accommodate His revelation to the thought-forms of the ancient audience, using their own literary genres to communicate His unique message in a way they could understand, while simultaneously correcting the pagan worldview embedded in those genres.

#Section 17. On the Existence of Non-Physical Intelligences: A Refutation of the Charge of Superfluous Superstition

#New Thesis: Angels and Demons as Pre-Scientific Superstition

The belief in angels and demons—non-physical, intelligent beings who interact with the world—is a relic of a pre-scientific, superstitious worldview. In an age of scientific naturalism, such entities are superfluous. Phenomena once attributed to angelic or demonic influence can now be explained by natural causes, such as physics, neurology, and psychology.55 There is no empirical evidence for their existence, and they are not required for a moral or ethical life. Therefore, belief in such beings is an unnecessary and irrational component of Christian theology, a holdover from a “disenchanted” world’s mythological past.56

#New Antithesis: A Cumulative Case for Non-Physical Intelligences from Scripture, Tradition, and Philosophy

The dismissal of angels and demons as mere superstition is itself a product of an uncritical commitment to metaphysical naturalism, not a conclusion of science or reason. A robust case for the existence of such beings can be constructed from the consistent and pervasive testimony of scripture and tradition, supported by philosophical arguments for the reality of non-physical mind (dualism). To reject the angelic is not to reject a minor or optional doctrine, but to challenge the coherence of the biblical worldview and the very possibility of a reality beyond the purely physical.

#17.1 The Pervasive Biblical and Traditional Testimony

Belief in angels and demons is not a peripheral or late addition to Christian doctrine; it is woven into the fabric of the biblical narrative from Genesis to Revelation and is a constant feature of Christian tradition.55

Angels: In both the Old and New Testaments, angels (malakh in Hebrew, angelos in Greek, both meaning “messenger”) serve as God’s agents, messengers, and warriors.56 They appear to patriarchs like Abraham and Lot, minister to prophets like Elijah, announce the births of John the Baptist and Jesus, and engage in cosmic warfare under the archangel Michael.58 They constitute God’s heavenly court and are mediators between the divine and human realms.56
Demons: The New Testament is replete with accounts of demons as fallen angels, led by Satan, who oppose God’s purposes, promote false doctrine, and afflict humanity.58 Jesus’s ministry involves numerous exorcisms, presented as a direct confrontation with the kingdom of darkness. The apostles continue this, warning against the worship of demons and engaging in “spiritual warfare”.60
Tradition: Early Church Fathers, scholastic theologians like Thomas Aquinas (who provided a detailed metaphysical analysis of angelic nature in his Summa Theologiae 56), and Reformers like John Calvin all affirmed their existence. To dismiss them is to set oneself against the overwhelming consensus of 2,000 years of Christian thought.

#17.2 The Philosophical Argument from Mind-Body Dualism

The metaphysical naturalist’s rejection of non-physical intelligences is often rooted in a broader physicalist assumption that all reality is reducible to matter and its properties. However, this physicalism is a contested philosophical position, and powerful arguments from the philosophy of mind support dualism—the view that mind and mental phenomena are irreducibly non-physical.61

Property Dualism: Argues that mental states like consciousness and qualia (the subjective experience of “what it’s like” to see red or feel pain) are non-physical properties that emerge from complex physical systems like the brain but are not reducible to them.62 The argument from knowledge (e.g., Nagel’s “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”) suggests that no amount of third-person, physical information about a brain can capture the first-person, subjective reality of consciousness.62
Substance Dualism: The stronger view, defended by Descartes and others, holds that the mind is a distinct, non-physical substance that can exist apart from the body.61

If it is philosophically plausible that non-physical mental properties or even mental substances (human souls) can exist in conjunction with physical bodies, then it is also plausible that non-physical intelligences could exist without bodies. The philosophical arguments for dualism open the metaphysical door to the possibility of beings like angels.

#17.3 Angels as a Bulwark Against Reductive Materialism

Far from being superfluous, belief in the angelic realm serves a crucial theological function: it confronts us with the reality of the “unseen” world mentioned in the Nicene Creed and pushes back against the modern tendency toward reductive materialism.55 As C.S. Lewis argued, a theology without angels is a theology without mystery, and it will ultimately fail to accommodate God Himself.55 Belief in angels forces an acknowledgment of a spiritual reality that transcends the purely physical, which is the very foundation of theism. The “disenchantment of the world” is not a neutral scientific discovery but a philosophical shift. Affirming the existence of angels is a direct challenge to that shift.

#17.4 The Nature of Demonic Evil

The doctrine of demons also provides a profound theological account of the nature of evil. As C.S. Lewis powerfully articulated, demons are not created evil, but are “bent” or fallen angels.64 Evil is not an independent substance but a corruption of a prior good. The higher and more powerful a being is in its natural state, the more horrific its evil becomes when it rebels against God. “It’s not out of bad mice or bad fleas you make demons, but out of bad archangels”.65 This view provides a coherent explanation for the existence of radical, intelligent evil in the world that goes beyond mere human malice, grounding it in the rebellion of powerful spiritual beings against their Creator.

#Section 18. On the Nature of Hell: A Defense of the “Choice” Model against Charges of Unorthodoxy

#New Thesis: C.S. Lewis’s “Choice” Model as Unbiblical Fiction

In works like The Great Divorce, C.S. Lewis presents a model of Hell not as a place of externally imposed, retributive punishment, but as a state of self-chosen separation from God. The damned are those who ultimately prefer themselves to God, and the “gates of hell are locked from the inside”.66 The new thesis objects that this “choice” model, while perhaps psychologically appealing, is an idiosyncratic and unbiblical fiction. It deviates from traditional Christian doctrine by suggesting post-mortem chances for salvation and by downplaying the retributive justice of God. It is a modern invention, unsupported by scripture or the major theologians of church history, created as a soft alternative to both the traditional view and universalism.68

#New Antithesis: The “Choice” Model as a Profound Theological and Moral Supposal

This objection misreads Lewis’s intent and misunderstands the nature of his work. Lewis himself explicitly states that The Great Divorce is a “fantasy” or an “imaginative supposal,” not a literal description of post-mortem geography.69 Its purpose is not to offer a new systematic theology of the afterlife, but to provide a powerful moral and psychological exploration of the nature of human choice in relation to God. The core of the “choice” model is profoundly biblical and theologically orthodox, as it grounds damnation in the uncoerced freedom of the human will and provides a coherent resolution to the apparent conflict between divine love and eternal punishment.

#18.1 The Work as Imaginative Supposal, Not Systematic Theology

Lewis prefaces The Great Divorce with a caution to his readers: “The last thing I wish is to arouse factual curiosity about the details of the after-world”.69 The narrative devices—the bus from Hell to Heaven, the post-mortem conversations, the tangible nature of Heaven versus the ghost-like nature of the damned—are literary tools. They are not meant as “pious speculation” to fill in doctrinal gaps.66 Their purpose is to make the abstract nature of the choice between Self and God vividly concrete. To critique the book for not being a literal, systematic account of the afterlife is to critique it for not being what it never intended to be.68 The benefit of the book comes not from accepting its imaginative landscape, but from using its clear lens to understand the nature of the choice we face in
this life.70

#18.2 The Theological Core: The Two Kinds of People

The central theological thesis of the book is articulated by the character of George MacDonald: “There are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to God, ‘Thy will be done,’ and those to whom God says, in the end, ‘Thy will be done.’ All that are in Hell, choose it”.70 This is the essence of the “choice” model. Hell is the ultimate, final trajectory of a life centered on the Self. It is the state of getting what one has always wanted: to be the center of one’s own universe, to reign in one’s own self-made hell rather than serve in God’s reality, which is Heaven.70
This is a profoundly orthodox insight. It grounds the justice of Hell in the principle of human freedom and responsibility. God does not arbitrarily cast people into Hell; He honors their definitive, final choice. The damned are not victims of divine tyranny but are authors of their own misery. As MacDonald’s character explains, the damned soul is “shrunk, shut up in itself… Their fists are clenched, their teeth are clenched, their eyes fast shut. First they will not, in the end they cannot, open their hands for gifts”.69

#18.3 Resolving the Tension Between Love and Justice

The “choice” model provides a powerful resolution to the moral problem of Hell. How can a loving God condemn souls to eternal suffering? Lewis’s answer is that He doesn’t. The souls condemn themselves. God’s love is a relentless, pursuing fire, but it cannot and will not violate the freedom of the creature. The “gates of hell are locked from the inside”.67 The damned are not people whom God has ceased to love, but people who have made themselves constitutionally incapable of receiving love. They have preferred their own sin—their pride, their resentment, their self-pity, their intellectual vanity—to the joy that is offered to them.70 Hell is the natural, inevitable consequence of a soul’s final, unrepented rejection of God, who is the source of all joy, life, and reality.

#18.4 The Moral Psychology of Damnation

The genius of The Great Divorce lies in its brilliant portrayal of the moral psychology of this self-damnation. Through a series of vignettes, Lewis shows how seemingly small sins and attachments, when clung to and preferred over God, can become demonic and ultimately lead to a soul’s complete self-enclosure.70 The grumbling woman, the apostate bishop, the possessive mother, the insecure artist—each is given the chance to let go of their defining sin and accept joy, and each freely chooses to return to the grey town of Hell, preferring their familiar misery to the painful surrender required by Heaven.73 This makes the doctrine of Hell not an abstract theological puzzle, but a deeply personal and existential warning about the ultimate trajectory of our everyday choices. The book is not primarily about the afterlife, but about how our choices in
this life are setting us on a heavenward or hell-ward path.69

#Section 19. On Eternal Punishment: A Defense of Eternal Conscious Torment against Charges of Injustice

#New Thesis: The Moral Repugnance of Eternal Conscious Torment

The traditional doctrine of Hell as a place of Eternal Conscious Torment (ECT) is morally repugnant and incompatible with the justice of God. This objection has several facets: (1) It is disproportionate: how can finite, temporal sins warrant an infinite, eternal punishment?.74 (2) It seems to contradict God’s love and mercy. (3) It appears to tarnish God’s ultimate victory over evil, leaving a permanent, unredeemed “dark spot” in His creation.74 Alternative views like annihilationism (the wicked are punished and then cease to exist) or universalism are presented as more morally coherent and biblically plausible options.75

#New Antithesis: The Justice of Eternal Punishment as a Consequence of Infinite Sin and a Reflection of Divine Holiness

The doctrine of Eternal Conscious Torment, while admittedly difficult and sobering, is a direct consequence of a high view of both the holiness of God and the gravity of sin. It is supported by significant biblical evidence and can be defended as just on the grounds that sin against an infinitely worthy being constitutes an infinitely heinous offense. The objections against it often stem from a diminished view of God’s character and a modern sentimentality that fails to grasp the biblical understanding of divine justice.

#19.1 The Argument from the Infinite Value of God

A key theological argument for the justice of ECT is that the gravity of an offense is measured not only by the act itself but by the dignity and worth of the one against whom it is committed.76 For example, striking a peer is a lesser offense than striking a head of state. Sin, in the biblical view, is not merely the breaking of an impersonal rule but a rebellion against and a rejection of an infinitely holy, good, and glorious God. Therefore, a sin committed against an infinite being is an offense of infinite gravity and thus deserves an infinite punishment.76 The punishment is eternal not because the act of sinning took an infinite time, but because the God who was offended is of infinite worth.

#19.2 The Biblical Evidence for Eternal, Conscious Punishment

While some passages can be interpreted to support annihilationism (e.g., those using words like “destroy” or “perish”), proponents of ECT argue that the weight of biblical evidence, particularly in the New Testament, points toward unending, conscious suffering for the damned.

Matthew 25:46: Jesus draws a direct parallel between the fate of the righteous and the wicked: “And these will go away into eternal (aiōnios) punishment, but the righteous into eternal (aiōnios) life”.74 The same Greek adjective describes the duration of both states. If the life of the righteous is unending, then logical consistency demands that the punishment of the wicked is also unending. To argue otherwise is to apply a double standard to the word
aiōnios.78
Revelation 14:11 and 20:10: These passages offer the most explicit descriptions. Of those who worship the beast, it is said, “the smoke of their torment goes up forever and ever, and they have no rest, day or night”.74 The phrase “no rest, day or night” strongly implies ongoing conscious experience. Later, the devil, the beast, and the false prophet are thrown into the lake of fire to be “tormented day and night forever and ever” (Revelation 20:10). Unsaved human beings are then cast into the same lake of fire, which is called the “second death”.74
Mark 9:48: Jesus describes Hell as a place “where their worm does not die, and the fire is not quenched,” quoting from Isaiah 66:24.75 This imagery suggests an unending process of decay and torment, not a swift consumption. The “destruction” spoken of elsewhere can be interpreted not as cessation of being, but as an ongoing state of ruin and loss of original function, much like a ruined wineskin that still exists but is no longer fit for its purpose.77

#19.3 The Nature of Hell as Retributive Justice

The punishment of Hell is presented in scripture as just retribution, not as corrective or redemptive discipline.76 It is the final, just consequence for a life of unrepentant rebellion against God. The emotional objection that a loving God or His saints could not be happy knowing others are in Hell 74 fails to consider that in the eschatological state, the saints’ wills will be perfectly aligned with God’s. They will see the perfect justice of God’s final judgment and affirm it. The glory of God’s justice, displayed in the punishment of intransigent evil, will be part of the perfection of the new creation, not a blemish upon it. God’s ultimate victory is not compromised; it is demonstrated by the final and permanent quarantine and punishment of all that is evil and opposed to His righteous reign.

#Section 20. On Divine Mercy and Justice: A Refutation of their Supposed Incompatibility in the Doctrine of Hell

#New Thesis: The Contradiction Between Mercy and the Justice of Hell

The doctrine of Hell presents an irreconcilable contradiction between God’s attributes of justice and mercy. If God is infinitely merciful, as Christian theology claims, He would not permit any soul to suffer eternal damnation. Conversely, if His justice demands eternal punishment for unrepentant sinners, then His mercy must be finite and ultimately subordinate to a retributive impulse. The two attributes appear to be in a zero-sum relationship; magnifying one seems to require diminishing the other. Therefore, the traditional doctrine of Hell makes the concept of a God who is simultaneously perfectly just and perfectly merciful incoherent.72

#New Antithesis: The Harmonious Manifestation of Justice and Mercy in Hell

This objection falsely frames divine justice and mercy as opposing forces. In classical theology, they are two harmonious aspects of God’s single, perfect character. The doctrine of Hell, when properly understood through the lens of human freedom, is a manifestation of both divine justice and a profound, albeit tragic, form of divine mercy. Justice is served by giving unrepentant souls the end they have chosen and deserve, while mercy is shown in God’s respect for the freedom of His creatures and by allowing them the only existence they can tolerate—one apart from Him.

#20.1 Justice as Respect for Free Choice

The justice of Hell is primarily grounded in God’s unwavering respect for the dignity of human freedom.72 God created beings with the capacity to freely accept or reject His love. To force a soul that has definitively and finally rejected Him into a heavenly union would be a violation of that soul’s freedom—a form of divine coercion that is incompatible with the nature of love. The justice of Hell lies in God giving such souls precisely what they have freely and persistently chosen: a state of existence centered on themselves, apart from God. As Jesus’s words to St. Faustina suggest, when souls “bring all My graces to naught, I begin to be angry with them, leaving them alone and giving them what they want”.72 This is not the act of a tyrant, but of a just judge who honors the final, settled verdict of the individual’s own will.

#20.2 Mercy as Non-Coercion and the “Lesser” Suffering

The mercy of Hell is more subtle but equally profound.

The Mercy of Non-Coercion: God’s mercy is shown in His refusal to compel love. A heaven populated by beings forced to be there against their will would not be Heaven. God’s mercy respects the integrity of the person He created, even when that person chooses self-destruction. As C.S. Lewis famously wrote, “The gates of hell are locked from the inside”.67 The damned are not those God has ceased to love, but those who have made themselves incapable of receiving His love. God’s mercy allows them to have the self-centered existence they crave.
The Mercy of Mitigated Presence: Furthermore, several saints and theologians have taught that Hell itself is an expression of mercy because it is the state of least possible suffering for a soul that hates God. To be in the full, unveiled presence of God—who is pure goodness, truth, and love—would be an unbearable and infinite torment for a soul that has defined itself by its opposition to those very things. Hell, as a state of “outer darkness” or separation from God, is thus a merciful quarantine that shields the damned soul from the full, agonizing presence of the Good which it despises. God gives them as much of Himself as they can bear, which in their case is next to nothing.

#20.3 God’s Priority of Mercy

The Christian narrative overwhelmingly affirms the priority of God’s mercy. God’s hand is “reluctant to take hold of the sword of justice”.72 He does not desire the death of the sinner but relentlessly offers grace and opportunities for repentance throughout their lives. He sent His Son to die on the Cross to provide a way of salvation from Hell.72 Justice, in the form of final condemnation, is God’s “strange work,” a last resort used only when His infinite offers of mercy have been definitively and finally rejected. The existence of Hell does not negate the infinitude of God’s mercy; rather, it highlights the tragic gravity of a free will that can, and sometimes does, say a final and ultimate “no” to that mercy. Thus, justice and mercy are not at odds; they are perfectly harmonized in a God who lovingly offers salvation to all but justly honors the final choice of those who refuse it.

#Conclusion

This dialectical analysis has traversed fifteen distinct yet interconnected debates at the heart of philosophical theology. In each case, a formidable objection to a core tenet of classical theism—a “new thesis”—was examined and subjected to a comprehensive refutation. The analysis demonstrates that these objections, while intellectually serious, are far from decisive. They frequently rely on category errors, logical fallacies, unexamined presuppositions, or a failure to engage with the sophisticated conceptual resources available within the classical theistic tradition.
The refutations presented herein reveal several recurring themes. First, the critical importance of precise definitions and the avoidance of equivocation is paramount. Debates over causality, infinity, and divine attributes often turn on the conflation of physical concepts with metaphysical ones. Second, the systematic coherence of theism is a source of great strength; doctrines like divine simplicity, immutability, and aseity are not isolated claims but are mutually supporting components of a single, logically integrated worldview. An attack on one often fails because it ignores the support provided by the others. Third, many modern objections are rooted in a philosophical anthropology that is hyper-individualistic and a metaphysics that is implicitly naturalistic; they falter when confronted with the corporate and supernatural frameworks of classical thought.
This report has sought to show that robust, logically sound, and intellectually satisfying responses to these major challenges are available. The aim was not to silence all debate, for the dialectic of philosophy is ongoing. Rather, the goal was to demonstrate that classical theism is not a fragile edifice of faith awaiting its inevitable collapse under the weight of modern critique. It is, instead, a resilient and intellectually rigorous philosophical system capable of meeting the most severe objections with arguments of considerable power and nuance. The ultimate conclusion is that belief in the God of classical theism is not only a matter of faith but can be a commitment grounded in and defended by the rigorous application of reason.

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